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Erdo\u011fan\u2019s claim and responses by Western governments and intelligence services<\/p>\n
With the coup attempt ongoing, Erdo\u011fan claimed, on national TV, that Fethullah G\u00fclen, a retired preacher and a vocal Erdo\u011fan critic, was the coup\u2019s mastermind. G\u00fclen condemned the attempt while it was in progress and denied any involvement. He challenged the Erdo\u011fan government to allow for an international investigation into the event (Exhibit B). He pledged to abide by its ruling. Erdo\u011fan did not respond to this call.<\/p>\n
Western governments and observers have not accepted Erdo\u011fan\u2019s narrative of July 15th, either. In particular:<\/p>\n
\u2022 Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that the Turkish government, as part of the extradition process, must link G\u00fclen to the incident with evidence that withstands scrutiny in an American court. As of this writing, approximately one year after the incident, the Turkish Government has not submitted evidence that meets this criterion.<\/p>\n
\u2022 James Clapper, former director of U.S. National Intelligence, said G\u00fclen\u2019s involvement in the coup didn\u2019t pass the \u201csmell test\u201d of credibility.<\/p>\n
\u2022 The United State House Intelligence Committee chairman Devin Nunes told Fox News that it was \u201chard to believe\u201d that the U.S.-based Turkish cleric was behind the attempt.<\/p>\n
\u2022 When asked by Der Spiegel whether G\u00fclen was behind the coup, Bruno Kahl, Head of Germany\u2019s BDN Foreign Intelligence Agency, responded, \u201cTurkey has tried to convince us of that at every level but so far it has not succeeded.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u2022 The European Union Intelligence Center INTCEN\u2019s report on the incident contradicted the Turkish government\u2019s claim that Fethullah G\u00fclen was behind the plot. The report concluded that the coup was mounted by a range of Mr. Erdo\u011fan\u2019s opponents. The Service found it unlikely that G\u00fclen himself played a role in the attempt, according to the Times of London. It also determined Erdo\u011fan\u2019s purges were planned well before the incident.<\/p>\n
\u2022 German Focus magazine reported in their July 2016 issue that British signals intelligence agency GCHQ intercepted communication between top Erdo\u011fan brass about half an hour after shooting started that the coup would be blamed on G\u00fclen and purges would start the next day.<\/p>\n
\u2022 A report by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament on UK-Turkish relations stated that the \u201cUK government does not have any evidence that U.S.-based cleric Fethullah G\u00fclen organized Turkey’s July coup attempt.\u201d The report went on to say:<\/p>\n
Given the brutality of the events of 15 July, the severity of the charges made against the G\u00fclenists, and the scale of the purges of perceived G\u00fclenists that has been justified on this basis, there is a relative lack of hard, publicly\u2013available evidence to prove that the G\u00fclenists as an organisation were responsible for the coup attempt in Turkey. While there is evidence to indicate that some individual G\u00fclenists were involved, it is mostly anecdotal or circumstantial, sometimes premised on information from confessions or informants, and is\u2014so far\u2014inconclusive in relation to the organisation as a whole or its leadership.<\/p>\n
Why the Turkish government\u2019s narrative was not found credible by the West<\/p>\n
\u2022 The day after the coup attempt, the Turkish government began purging thousands of members of not just the military, but also the judiciary. Western observers noted that it would be impossible for the government to identify those responsible for the incident on such short notice.<\/p>\n
\u2022 The lack of concrete evidence linking G\u00fclen to the incident. The few testimonies extracted from officers who \u201cconfessed\u201d their links to the Hizmet movement were not found credible because, ironically, pro-government media channels aired photos of those same officers showing clear signs of torture.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Finally, Erdo\u011fan\u2019s own narrative is full of contradictions. Erdo\u011fan claimed that he or his intelligence service knew nothing about the preparations for a military coup attempt up until the day of July 15. Western observers found it inconceivable that an event of this magnitude, which would require weeks if not months of preparation, could be orchestrated from another continent and not be discovered by Turkish Intelligence and a host of other intelligence agencies. Erdo\u011fan claimed to have learned about the event not from his intelligence service, but from his brother-in-law. Yet, he did not dismiss the head of the intelligence service who, according to his own narrative, not only failed to detect the preparations for the incident, also failed to inform or protect the president after receiving a tip from an informant on the afternoon of July 15. Similarly, the chief of general staff was not dismissed despite failing to stop the incident after having learned about it several hours in advance.<\/p>\n
Some observers also noted the following two reasons why G\u00fclen organizing such an attempt would be implausible and irrational:<\/p>\n
Starting in the early 1990s, Hizmet movement participants have set up schools, hospitals, medical clinics, and other civic institutions around the world. A coup attempt masterminded by G\u00fclen, if successful, would send an alarming message to world leaders and spell the end of Hizmet around the world.<\/p>\n
The top brass of the Turkish military consists mostly of Kemalists, or those sympathetic to the ideology of the founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atat\u00fcrk. There has never been a credible allegation that the top brass had any G\u00fclen sympathizers. In fact, none of the top brass, including the chief of general staff, second chief, force commanders or army corps commanders has been accused of being a G\u00fclen sympathizer. In an information age, it is impossible for lower level officers to stage a coup without the knowledge and approval of the top brass. If they did, there would be strong reaction from within the military itself. On the night of the coup, there was very little reaction from within the military itself.<\/p>\n
Adding to suspicions about the government\u2019s narrative was the Erdo\u011fan government\u2019s apparent unwillingness to fully investigate the incident. The parliamentary commission was delayed because the ruling AKP party delayed appointing members to the commission. Once formed, the commission, dominated by AKP members, refused to call key witnesses for testimony. Mithat Sancar, an opposition member of the commission, said the following:<\/p>\n
The ruling AKP did not form this commission to illuminate the coup attempt. They constructed a coup narrative\u2026 They were expecting (this commission to produce) a work that would support this narrative.<\/p>\n
Only information or rumors that support the government narrative have been allowed to be disseminated, and all other information has been censored by government authorities and a compliant media. Scores of lawyers have been arrested and attorney-client privilege has been revoked under a state of emergency, leaving accused individuals unable to defend themselves through due process.<\/p>\n
Below we provide a narrative based on the information available from public sources and received in personal communications with the lawyers, relatives, or friends of individuals accused by the Turkish government. The author of this document is not in a position to claim that the following is what happened, but the alternative scenario provided here answers more questions than the government narrative, and therefore deserves to be considered as part of an independent investigation.<\/p>\n Possible narratives about July 15, 2016<\/strong><\/p>\n The broad coalition<\/strong><\/p>\n The prevalent view among Turkey observers in Europe and the U.S. is the following: A broad coalition of military officers, from different ideological backgrounds, had discussed an intervention against the Erdo\u011fan government. They believed Erdo\u011fan undermined Turkey\u2019s democratic institutions and secularism. This coalition included but was not limited to officers who feared being purged at the August meeting of the Military Supreme Council. An informant alerted Turkish Intelligence of the plot on the afternoon of July 15, forcing some officers to start the action early. However, many officers gave up and refrained from participating, and hence the action of the remaining officers was doomed to failure.<\/p>\n Collusion<\/strong><\/p>\n In another theory, a broad coalition of officers had been against the Erdo\u011fan government. They had been discussing a potential military coup for months. Turkish intelligence and Erdo\u011fan were aware of these discussions. An ultra-nationalist faction among the military associated with the Eurasian-oriented Homeland Party (Vatan) colluded with Erdo\u011fan and the Turkish intelligence to stage a pre-emptive coup on July 15. The collusion narrative suggests that the incident on July 15 was a mobilization of a very small portion of the military, a weak and compromised action designed to fail.<\/p>\n According to this narrative, the attempted coup was, borrowing the language of a political commentator, \u201cA genuine plan that was compromised and weakened, and allowed by President Erdo\u011fan to play out in order to crush it and achieve his strategic goals.\u201d<\/p>\n The so-called \u201cEurasianist clique\u201d within the Turkish military[1] was described in a 2003 leaked cable by U.S. Embassy in Ankara as pursuing Eurasianism as an alternative to the U.S. \u201cwithout understanding the Russia-dominated nature of the \u2018Eurasia\u2019 concept\u201d. In 2003, the pro-U.S. and pro-NATO group called the \u201cAtlanticists\u201d were seen as losing influence within the Turkish General Staff.<\/p>\n What happened on July 15th does not exhibit the pattern of a coup planned by the military, but rather one planned by the intelligence service where military officers unwittingly played a crucial role. From their testimonies, these officers were mobilized under the pretense of participation in a regular exercise, educational exercise, \u201cunconventional exercise,\u201d operation to protect general staff headquarters, or protection of a military or civilian compound from a terrorist attack. It is also important to note here that there is not a single officer who states in his testimony that he acted by the directives of a civilian. This is worth noting, for the government narrative claims that officers associated with G\u00fclen staged the coup with directives from civilians affiliated with G\u00fclen.<\/p>\n Other indicators also substantiate the argument that the coup attempt was premediated to provoke public outrage and pave the way for Erdo\u011fan\u2019s autocracy. For instance, many civilian deaths happened not in the hands of soldiers, as Erdo\u011fan\u2019s media claimed, but by some paramilitaries connected to SADAT, a defense consulting company, which is becoming \u201cErdo\u011fan\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.\u201d[2] Erol Ol\u00e7ok and his son were killed on the night of the coup, and Ol\u00e7ok\u2019s wife is telling, based on eye-witnesses, that they were killed by snipers.<\/p>\n Bombing of the Parliament has also left a lot of questions. The images of the parliament building show a much less damage than F16 figher bomb would leave behind; they are more like a C4 explosion from inside, not from above.<\/p>\n Contradictions in the Erdo\u011fan camp<\/strong><\/p>\n The statements by President Erdo\u011fan and his allies, including Hakan Fidan, the director of National Intelligence Service (MIT) and the chief of general staff, include many contradictions and leave many important questions unanswered.<\/p>\n Although Erdo\u011fan said he learned about the coup on the night of the coup from his brother-in-law, H\u00fcseyin G\u00fcrler, a noncommissioned officer, says in his testimony that they informed the President on June 11, 2016.<\/p>\n Erdo\u011fan\u2019s refusal to fire, or even investigate, his intelligence chief and military chief despite their failure to inform or protect him remains a puzzle.<\/p>\n Erdo\u011fan\u2019s claim that he was first informed about the event by his brother-in-law around 9:30 pm and that he could not reach his intelligence chief were contradicted by Chief of General Staff Akar. In his written statement to the parliamentary investigation committee, Akar stated that Intelligence Chief Fidan called and spoke with the head of Erdo\u011fan\u2019s guard while in his presence before 8:30 pm. H\u00fcrriyet columnist Ertu\u011frul \u00d6zk\u00f6k wrote on July 18, 2017, that Prime Minister Binali Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m said in an interview with Fikret Bila that he called Director Fidan at around 10:30 – 11 pm that night, and Mr. Fidan did not say anything to him nor to President Erdo\u011fan about the coup attempt.<\/p>\n Erdo\u011fan claimed that his airplane was assaulted by pro-coup fighter jets but protected by pro-government jets. The Greek Air Force refuted Erdo\u011fan\u2019s claims stating that no such air fight occurred.<\/p>\n On the afternoon of Friday, July 15, a captain referred to as O.K. informed MIT (National Intelligence Organization) headquarters that an attack on the headquarters was planned, with the goal of capturing MIT Chief Fidan. This officer was never identified publicly, ostensibly to protect him, and he was later discharged from the military, rather than given a medal of honor. He was later re-admitted to the military and given a position at MIT.<\/p>\n MIT Chief Fidan sent his deputy to the Office of General Staff at 4 pm and later met with the Military Chief Gen. Akar at 6 pm. According to the accounts of President Erdo\u011fan and PM Yildirim, Fidan did not inform or protect the president or the prime minister. In fact, they claimed that they could not communicate with Fidan until 10 pm.<\/p>\n Fidan\u2019s account of the events is full of puzzles and contradictions. According to Gen. Akar\u2019s testimony, Fidan called Erdo\u011fan\u2019s guards and asked them if they were prepared for an attack, without specifying the nature or the scale of the attack and without asking to speak with President Erdo\u011fan. Instead of staying with Gen. Akar to investigate and take precautions against a possible coup, Fidan left the general staff headquarters to attend pre-arranged meetings.<\/p>\n Gen. Umit Dundar, commander of the 1st army in Istanbul, pledged allegiance to Erdo\u011fan during the early hours of the attempt, according to Berat Albayrak, Erdo\u011fan\u2019s son-in-law. It is unlikely that the military leadership would consider committing to a coup without the participation of the commander of the 1st army. It is possible, therefore that Dundar earlier gave the impression that he was in favor of a coup and misled some officers while intending to side with Erdo\u011fan.<\/p>\n Military units in Istanbul closed access to the Bosphorus Bridge around 8 pm. It was later revealed that these units were under the impression that they were participating in an exercise. Gen. Dundar did nothing to stop the bridge closure despite the fact that the bridge lies in the area of the 1st army.<\/p>\n Gen. Hulusi Akar, Chief of General Staff, did not go along with the demands of the pro-coup officers. However, some of his actions raise questions. Could top level commanders hold meetings about a military coup without his knowledge and approval? Was he threatened by Erdo\u011fan to play along with his plan? Why did he not protect himself or the general staff headquarters, or inform Erdo\u011fan? Why did he not take more effective actions between 4 pm, when he was first informed by MIT Chief Fidan, and 9 pm, when he was reportedly taken hostage?<\/p>\n Gen. Akar was also criticized for not recalling force commanders, who were attending wedding ceremonies, to return to their headquarters and resume command of their forces. Despite the early information, these commanders did not take precautions to protect themselves and were later taken hostage. Their self-reported actions to try to stop the coup attempt were meager and raise many questions.<\/p>\n Gen. Ak\u0131n Ozturk, the former commander of the Air Force, was charged with being the military leader of the coup by the government. However, the Office of the Chief of the General Staff issued a message describing him as a hero who tried to stop the pro-coup officers and prevent bloodshed. This message was later removed, but is available on other sites. He was charged nevertheless, then arrested and jailed.<\/p>\n Selahattin Demirtas, the co-chair of the HDP, the second largest opposition party, in a speech before the Turkish parliament, stated that Erdo\u011fan knew about the coup attempt and foiled it before it started and his men added some dramatic elements (such as bombing the parliament) allowing Erdo\u011fan to take full political advantage of the incident. Demirtas also claimed that many in the parliament were aware of this but afraid to speak publicly. Demirtas was arrested in February 2017 under terrorism charges.<\/p>\n Responses to the government\u2019s \u201cevidence\u201d against G\u00fclen<\/p>\n The Erdo\u011fan government\u2019s alleged \u201cevidence\u201d implicating G\u00fclen and his sympathizers fails to convince.<\/p>\n The association of the three police officers who allegedly participated in the attempt alongside soldiers is questionable. These officers were not among the thousands of police officers purged by the Erdo\u011fan government prior to July 15. In any case, if Erdo\u011fan\u2019s claims of G\u00fclen having thousands of sympathizers within the police force is true, it doesn\u2019t make sense that only three would participate in the attempt.<\/p>\n The confessions of affiliation with G\u00fclen by officers like Levent Turkkan and General Sa\u011f\u0131r were taken under duress. These confessions are not reliable, as they later said they were tortured for those confessions.<\/p>\n Both G\u00fclen and Gen. Hakan Evrim, who allegedly made the offer for Akar to speak with G\u00fclen, denied this claim. Akar was not called to give testimony to the parliamentary commission about this and other allegations involving him. He did not address this issue in his written responses to the commission.<\/p>\n The government claimed that Adil Oksuz, who is a professor of Theology at Sakarya University, was the organizer of the air force officers affiliated with G\u00fclen. Besides the fact that it is impossible to stage a military coup with the air force alone, this allegation has many problems. The government claimed that Adil Oksuz was arrested near the Akinci Air Base, the alleged headquarters of the attempt. According to an interview given by Adil Oksuz\u2019s family, when he met with them before his disappearance, Oksuz claimed that he was brought to the base against his will after being detained at a police checkpoint. Despite the alleged presence of an intelligence service file on him, he was deliberately let free by two judges on July 16 and at a mandatory report at the courthouse on July 18. He then traveled on a commercial flight to Istanbul, going through airport security checkpoints with his own ID, and then disappeared after meeting his family. It appears that the government wanted Oksuz to disappear so that the claims against him and the alleged link to G\u00fclen could be circulated without challenge.<\/p>\n G\u00fclen acknowledged that around 30 years ago, when Oksuz was a student, he was part of a study circle within the movement. \u201cAdil Oksuz, at one time, I think when he was studying at school, he became part of our study circle,\u201d he replied.<\/p>\n But while he acknowledged the Turkish government\u2019s account that Oksuz had visited the Golden Generation Retreat and Recreation Center before the July 2016 coup bid, Gulen dismissed allegations that the visit constituted the smoking gun in the coup investigation. \u201cA few years ago, he [Oksuz] came here once. I later saw in the media this picture of his child with me. This is something hundreds of people do. From taking a picture to making that kind of connection would be jumping to conclusions.\u201d<\/p>\n Strategic goals achieved by Erdo\u011fan thanks to the coup attempt<\/p>\n The July 15th incident gave Erdo\u011fan an excellent excuse to pursue his goal of consolidating his power.<\/p>\n \u2022 The morning after the coup attempt, a huge purge started, with over 2,700 members of the judiciary and over 120,000 government employees sacked, 8,000 military officers dismissed, including 150 NATO officers.<\/p>\n \u2022 None of the army or army corps commanders have been accused of being G\u00fclen sympathizers. However, Gen. Adem Huduti, commander of the 2nd Army, was known as a Kemalist\/secularist commander, and Gen. Erdal Ozturk, commander of the 3rd Army Corps, was also known as a Kemalist\/secularist commander. Both were arrested. What these commanders had in common \u2013 along with Gen. Semih Terzi, commander of Special Forces\u2019 1st Brigade, who was killed by an inferior officer \u2013 was their strong opposition to the Turkish military\u2019s incursion into Syria. Shortly following the coup attempt, in August 2016, the Turkish military began an operation in Syria.<\/p>\n \u2022 Erdo\u011fan\u2019s bid for an executive presidency gained momentum. In a constitutional referendum in April 2017, Erdo\u011fan narrowly secured the path to his executive presidency.<\/p>\n Concluding remarks<\/strong><\/p>\n On July 15, 2016, a horrific and an unprecedented incident happened in Turkey. It cost the lives of hundreds of soldiers and civilians, and was crushed primarily by the efforts of the police force and civilians. Many aspects of the incident baffled observers, and many unanswered questions remain. As shown in this article, the actions of many of the primary actors don\u2019t make sense if the government\u2019s narrative is to be accepted. However, if an alternative narrative is considered, these actions make sense and the questions are answered. Based on many indicators listed above one highly likely narrative suggests it was a trap from the very beginning; it was planned and directed by MIT and its affiliates in the army with an impression as if it was a collective action in the chain of command. Officers who had already been profiled as oppositional were called in \u2013 they only obeyed orders without realizing it was a trap.<\/p>\n – On July 15, 2016, Turkey experienced a horrific event: an unsuccessful military coup. But a year after the tragedy, questions about what really happened remain unanswered. What we know for sure is that the failed coup provided President Erdo\u011fan with an excellent excuse to consolidate his power: despite widespread claims of voter fraud, he secured […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":401304,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[374],"tags":[4336,4943,1308,17057],"yoast_head":"\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/citifmonline.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/3-3.jpg\")
\u201cThe real coup was done on July 20, after the controlled coup of July 15th was over. Nobody should forget July 20th. This is the date when the executive branch got the approval for the state of emergency from the parliament. Now, the real putschists of July 20 want to constitutionalize the current situation.\u201d<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/citifmonline.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/4.png\")
![\"\"](\"http:\/\/citifmonline.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/5-3.jpg\")
any and all opponents not linked to the actual coup by claiming that they are Gulenists.\u201d
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, executive director of the Council for the National Interest.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\nBy: Yuksel A. Aslandogan. PHD\/fountainmagazine<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"