For the People\u2019s Republic of China, there is no pretence at charity or aid, they make no bones about their growing presence in Africa and intensions champion their national interest. In this economic cooperation the benefits for Africa largely depend on its capacity to drive a hard bargain with Beijing. As China\u2019s economic pursuits and presence expands on the continent the issue of physical security portents a challenge for Beijing.<\/p>\n
Throughout history, most external powers for which Africa\u2019s mineral wealth remains indispensable to their industrial growth backed up their economic forays with a projection of military might, to suppress local resis\u00actance. Following the lethal attack on a Chinese oil facility in Ethiopia, China Daily headlined: \u201cChina needs to consider new channels to protect overseas interests.\u201d
\nThis article discusses the security threats posed to China\u2019s economic investments; a 2014 research paper published by Yun Sun at Brookings classified these threats under broad themes set out in this commentary.
\nCriminal Attacks and Robbery on Chinese<\/p>\n
In January 2007, nine Chinese workers were kidnapped in southern Nigeria; following this attack was another in June of the same year where Shandong Qingrun China Exim bank\u2019s branch was robbed in Togo. By August 2007, four Chinese were robbed in Nigeria, where one of them was killed. In October of 2008, nine China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) workers were kidnapped in Sudan, five died.<\/p>\n
Attacks on Chinese projects due to labour disputes and illegal activities by Chinese companies<\/strong><\/p>\n Two Chinese workers in January 2007 were kidnapped by the anti-government \u201cMovement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta\u201d in southern Nigeria as a threat against Chinese companies\u2019 exploitation of crude oil in the Niger Delta, In April that year, the exploration site of Zhong Yuan Oil Field was attacked by the anti- government Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia, with nine Chinese workers killed. The attack was against \u201cany investment in Ogaden that benefits the Ethiopian government.<\/p>\n October 2010, unrest at Collum Coal Mine in Zambia led to 11 local mining workers being shot and wounded by Chinese managers and three Chinese being injured. A related incident occurred two years later in August 2012, when a Chinese mine manager was killed following a salary dispute at the same Collum Coal Mine.<\/p>\n Chinese Vessels Attacked By Somali Pirates<\/strong><\/p>\n In November 2008, the Chinese fishing vessel Tianyu No. 8 was seized by Somali pirates while fishing off the coast of Kenya. The ship was released the following year on February 8, 2009, with 24 crew members safely on board. In December of 2008, the Chinese fishing boat Zhenhua 4 was hijacked on its way back to Shanghai, but was rescued within four hours by a Malaysian warship and military.<\/p>\n Another attack was launched in October 2009 on a Chinese bulk carrier owned by COSCO Qingdao was captured 700 miles east of the Somali coastline in the Indian Ocean. And in June 2010, the Singapore-flagged Chinese- chartered chemical tanker MV Golden Blessing was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden, and 19 Chinese crew members were taken hostage. The ship reportedly was released in November 2010 on payment of $2.8 million.<\/p>\n Security Threats resulting from Political Instability<\/strong><\/p>\n Domestic political turmoil are very popular in Africa, while some foreign powers are accused of exploiting instability to maximize profits, these turmoil\u2019s do present challenges to investors. And for the Chinese Communist Party, this instability remains a huge security threat to its nationals, investments, legitimacy, well as its internal and external prestige.<\/p>\n A classic case in point was Libyan civil war in 2011; China\u2019s Communist Party was forced, in part by domestic public opinion, to mobilize significant military and diplomatic resources to evacuate over than 30,000 Chinese nationals based in Libya. The Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army dispatched four military aircrafts and one naval vessel for the rescue mission.<\/p>\n In spite of the rescue, Chinese media reported \u201cmajor financial losses\u201d, explaining that the regime change resulted in total losses as high as $20 billion for Chinese companies on the ground, due to uncompleted contracts originally made with the Gadhafi government.<\/p>\n China\u2019s Security Policy<\/strong><\/p>\n Beijing primarily relied on its embassies to provide consular protection to Chinese nationals and investments. The challenge however is that on average, each Chinese consular officer serves 130,000 overseas Chinese nationals. Chinese embassies in Africa turn to on local governments to provide protection following its security policy of non-interference, however the inefficiency and incompetence of local African governments have made consular protection symbolic than effective. China was unable to deploy military forces because it follows strictly the principle of no overseas deployment.<\/p>\n Over the years, following the series of threats it has suffered, Beijing has consequently softened its devotion to non-interference, while maintaining the primacy of sovereignty. Today, it willingly supports interventions whenever regional stability is at stake, as this goes a long way to protect its investments. Instead of relying on its military presence to counterbalance internal threats, China has joined collective security efforts within the framework of the United Nations and African regional organizations in promoting peace and security in Africa.<\/p>\n China has moved beyond its reliance primarily on multilateral institutions, especially with the UN, for security and missions inside Africa. More recently, it began to dispatch PLA naval escort missions to the Gulf of Aden in 2008 under authorization by UN Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851 (resolutions about effectively rallying international efforts to battle Somali piracy). This does not conflict with its \u201cno troop abroad\u201d principle because of the U.N mandate on international efforts to crack the whip on Somali pirates. Since then, China has dispatched 16 fleets to escort 5,300 Chinese and foreign ships, and the missions remain active on the Gulf of Alden, ensuring the protection of its vessels.<\/p>\n In the years to come, China\u2019s economic cooperation with Africa is expected to grow simultaneously with the security challenges and China might have to develop security policies to suppress local resis\u00actance. The strategic importance of Africa in fuelling China\u2019s industrial growth cannot be understated, progressively China\u2019s growing military might and increasing diplomatic assertiveness may lead to a more strident security policy in the future of its economic relations with Africa. Favour E. Nunoo is a Ghanaian journalist, KAS Media Africa Scholar at University of the Witwatersrand and Reporter for the Wits China-Africa Reporting Project<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" For the People\u2019s Republic of China, there is no pretence at charity or aid, they make no bones about their growing presence in Africa and intensions champion their national interest. In this economic cooperation the benefits for Africa largely depend on its capacity to drive a hard bargain with Beijing. As China\u2019s economic pursuits and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":27043,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[8],"yoast_head":"\n
\nCommentary piece by: Favour E. Nunoo<\/p>\n